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Abstract 
General anesthesia is of course valued for sparing patients the physical pain and psychological 
trauma of being sensate and conscious during surgery, but it also poses a specific challenge to the 
narrative continuity often seen as a defining aspect of human identity and of mental health. The 
patient is (arguably) absented from the scene in which his or her body is (arguably) traumatized, 
and then returns to awareness to find a body that has been changed. This rupture in continuity 
presents a challenge to coherent first-person narration. Examining some of the strategies used by 
writers to represent the gap opened up by anesthesia, I suggest that such accounts illuminate our 
understanding of the connections between narrative rupture, trauma, and an ethical responsibility 
to recognize the possibility of sentience, and hence the capacity for suffering, in anaesthetized 
patients. 
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In her memoir Girl Interrupted, Susanna Kaysen describes undergoing a dental extraction. 
The experience begins with a conventional indicator of quantified awareness: the dentist 
tells her to “‘Lean back and count to ten” (Kaysen 107-8). What follows feels like a fold 
in chronology: “Before I got to four I was sitting up with a hole in my mouth.” Kaysen 
asks the dentist, “Where did it go?” and he shows her “my tooth, huge, bloody, spiked, 
and wrinkled.” But this is not what matters for Kaysen: “I’d been asking about the time,” 
she says; “I was ahead of myself. He’d dropped me into the future, and I didn’t know what 
had happened to the time in between.” Kaysen articulates the problem of anesthesia as a 
problem of lost time, of biographical as well as bodily rupture.  
The interchange also reveals a clinical disconnect: Kaysen’s dentist trusts that seeing 
the bloody tooth will satisfy her because it is material evidence of what happened during 
the lost time and because its shows that she was protected from experiencing that violent 
event. But Kaysen feels more violated by the extraction of her self from time, and this is 
exacerbated by the refusal of those who were awake to help her recuperate the loss. When 
she asks the dentist how long the procedure took, he doesn’t know precisely and isn’t 
interested in telling her, even when she insists, “It’s my time and I need to know how 
much it was.” Setting aside questions of Kaysen’s narrator as reliable or generalizable, we 
see her point: something significant has happened to her experience of continuity, and her 
health care provider does not think it matters. 
But patients may sometimes need assistance in measuring and recounting the operative 
period, the time between going under and coming round. Anesthesia can challenge the 
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security of a self constituted as continuous over time, and a clinical failure to support 
reconstitution of that self may result in trauma. Instances of “intraoperative awareness,” 
when experience is both present and registered, might help explain both the trauma anes-
thesia can cause and medicine’s limitations in addressing it, but these concerns may be 
applicable even in anesthetically successful operations, when (as far as anyone can tell) the 
patient has no experience of the surgery. 
First, though, a clarification: in what follows I will suggest that general anesthesia may 
promote or exacerbate certain harms. It should go without saying that I do not mean to 
suggest that surgery would be better or less psychologically harmful without anesthesia.  
Perhaps the best-known account of such an experience, written in 1812 by the novelist 
Fanny Burney, offers insight into the trauma surgery entails and also reveals the im-
portance of recuperating the self afterwards, of “tying together what passed” (Burney 443). 
Burney describes undergoing her own mastectomy, conveying her perceptions with careful 
precision: “When the wound was made, and the instrument was withdrawn, the pain 
seemed undiminished, for the air that suddenly rushed into those delicate parts felt like a 
mass of minute but sharp and forked poniards, that were tearing the edges of the 
wound…” (Burney 442).1 My point is that anesthesia is not an absolute palliative for sur-
gical trauma, and that its more complex challenges are easier to overlook than the unques-
tionable physical and mental suffering caused by what amounts to vivisection (albeit for 
beneficent ends). Burney’s letter suggests that she developed what we might now diagnose 
as post traumatic stress: 
 
for Months I could not speak of this terrible business without nearly again going through 
it! I could not think of it with impunity! I was sick, I was disordered by a single question - 
even now, 9 months after it is over, I have a headache from going on with the account! & 
this miserable account, which I began 3 Months ago, at least, I dare not revise, nor read, the 
recollection is still so painful. (442-3) 
 
Yet Burney persisted in reliving and narrating the events of her ordeal. Why? Theorists 
of trauma have long argued that a traumatizing event can be tolerably assimilated through 
its reconstruction in narrative form. Significant, then, is Burney’s recollection that for some 
moments during her ordeal she was not conscious: “Twice, I believe, I fainted; at least, I 
have two total chasms in my memory of this transaction, that impede my tying together 
what passed” (443). We might expect Burney to describe passing out as a blessed escape 
from torment. Instead she regards these moments—of being anesthetized by her own 
body—as an impediment to “tying together” the experience. This untying of experience, 
resonant with Kaysen’s sense of lost time, points to the surgical event as traumatizing as 
physical violation, but also as a personal event the subject may be prevented from recalling 
and recounting. 
Medicine and its content pose many challenges to narration. How do we (patient or 
clinician) tell, for example, what a particular pain really feels like? How do we tell (know 
and narrate) about early disease emerging inside a body? How do doctors prognosticate, 
or tell the future? And, in the present case, should we even want to be able to tell what 
happens during surgery? One patient’s optimistic account of obliteration and resurrection 
is a widely accepted ideal: “The thought of having someone knock me out and then bring 
 
1 Burney’s account has become somewhat canonical in discussions of the history of surgery and pain. 
See, for example, Snow 1-3; Tougaw 65-67. 
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me back to life when I’m all fixed comforts me” (Dale 53). In practice this may not be so 
simple.  
Anesthesia raises three related questions for me, regarding narratability, trauma, and 
ethics. First, if we associate human identity and mental health with a continuous and co-
herent narrative account of the self, what does it mean that anesthesia makes of surgery 
an absence, turning a significant event in the patient’s life into a biographical gap? How 
have Fanny Burney’s surgical descendants narrated their operations? What formal strategies 
are available for recounting this experience—or non-experience—and what can we learn 
from such efforts? Second: while we assume that conscious surgery is traumatic, the gap 
produced by anesthesia might illuminate existing theories about trauma and representa-
tion. Is it possible to be traumatized by a non-experience? Finally, an ethical claim follows 
from this: medicine has a moral responsibility to recognize the potentially traumatic effects 
of anesthesia, and to acknowledge the potential effect of this temporary and apparent (but 
not inevitable) lack of sentience on the moral status granted to the anesthetized patient? 
By extension, what about other patients whose sentience cannot be definitively verified 
(the comatose or those in minimally conscious states, for example)? We rely for evidence 
of sentience on the subject’s ability to indicate feeling, to express what it feels like, or to 
tell a retrospective account of how it felt. We risk discounting the experiential reality of 
what may be felt but not communicated or recalled. Anesthesia’s conventional countdown 
to oblivion may mark only the subject’s loss of the ability to count aloud, or to recount 
afterward what came between “three” and “four.” It does not inevitably denote the ex-
traction of feeling self from a body rendered inanimate. 
 
 
1. The Unnarratable 
I’m gone. 
Jamieson Dale, Chasing Beauty (54) 
 
Narratability is determined by events’ availability to take conceptual form as a story (the 
events must be knowable or imaginable); by a teller with the capacity to tell the story; and 
by the possibility for it be heard and accepted as a story (the narration must convey the 
story coherently and the story must be tolerable—not so distressing or offensive that a 
listener/reader will interrupt or flee).2 Anesthesia challenges all three requirements: key 
events are inaccessible or distorted; the patient may not remember them; and, importantly, 
probable listeners—clinicians, family members—cannot accept what narrative traces may 
emerge. For the anesthetist, a story about experience during anaesthetized surgery denotes 
a serious failure. Medicine is motivated to view the period between going under and com-
ing round as intentionally unnarratable because no possibility of story exists there. 
 One way to narrate anesthetized time, then, is to speculate, inventing fictional but 
narratable events. For example, H.G. Wells’s short story “Under the Knife” (1896) is nar-
rated by a surgical patient who, despite chloroform, apparently remains alert throughout 
the surgery that almost kills him. Wells’s account is worth comparing with Burney’s: “I fell 
motionless and a great silence, a monstrous silence and an impenetrable blackness came 
upon me. There must have been an interval of absolute unconsciousness, seconds or 
minutes. Then with a chilly, unemotional clearness, I perceived that I was not yet dead. I 
was still in my body” (Wells 54). He recounts retrospectively, as Burney did, what he has 
 
2 On the unnarratable, see Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, 623. 
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survived. The absolute unconsciousness is a gap in time—he cannot tell its duration—but 
the chloroform has severed perception from feeling (we might say he remains sensible but 
not sensitive): “all the multitudinous sensations that come sweeping from [my body] to 
make up the background of consciousness had gone …. Haddon [the surgeon] was bend-
ing over me …. It was interesting to see myself cut like cheese, without a pang, without 
even a qualm” (Wells 55). 
When a nicked blood vessel begins the hemorrhage that almost kills him, the patient’s 
experience expands into a sort of cosmic time travel, with anaesthetized—and near-
death—time vastly expanded rather than compressed to the nothing that most surgical 
patients recall: “my sense of duration had changed; … my mind was moving not faster but 
infinitely slower .… it appeared as if the time between thought and thought grew steadily 
greater, until at last a thousand years was but a moment in my perception” (Wells 60). The 
patient has been depressed before the surgery. Now, when he returns to his body, he ex-
periences great relief: “I perceived, suddenly, that the dull melancholy of half a year was 
lifted from my mind” (63). His near-death experience registers both as experience and as 
memorable, his imagined/recorded awareness possibly beginning as a failure of anesthesia, 
but disconnecting his consciousness from the chronotope of the operating room, culmi-
nating in an apprehension of the divine. Wells’s story suggests a continuity between the 
experience of anesthesia and of nearing death, and for him both are spiritually therapeutic. 
The anomaly, though, is that his fictitious narrator remembers enough to tell the story. 
Non-fiction autobiographical accounts of surgery usually come to a halt as the patient 
goes under. They recount a failure of memory, or rather a memory that finds nothing to 
remember. Time is not expanded or transcended in these narratives; it is erased, and this 
erasure is typically thought of as a good thing. An anesthesiology web site providing in-
formation for anxious presurgical patients informs them that “the first thing most people 
ask” as they emerge from anesthesia is “When are you going to start?”3 This is intended 
to reassure by constituting anaesthetized surgery as a non-experience, where the end of 
the process laps one’s anticipation of its beginning. This loss of time is seen as small price 
for avoiding intolerable pain.  
As medical technology advances, it can more effectively extract the patient’s sensate 
self from the surgery. Sylvia Plath’s 1950s poem “Face Lift” gives us a mini-history of 
surgical experience in the 1940s and  ’50s by recounting two experiences of anesthesia. 
The speaker remembers the first operation as an event from her childhood: “When I was 
nine, a lime-green anesthetist / Fed me banana gas through a frog-mask. / The nauseous 
vault / Boomed wild bad dreams  / and the Jovian voices of surgeons. / The mother 
swam up, holding a tin basin. / O I was sick.” Plath’s adult speaker remembers and re-
counts her experience as at once dreamlike—nightmarish—and distancing. But she has 
had a second, more recent operation with improved technology. This version is told in 
present tense, for there is nothing for her to look back on: “At the count of two / Darkness 
wipes me out like chalk  / on a blackboard     . . .    /  I don't know a thing.” The ellipsis 
is in the original, replacing the nauseatingly colorful chloroform twilight of the earlier tech-
nology.  
But chalk, of course, always leaves dusty traces on the blackboard. No longer legible, 
they are still present, demanding representational strategies. In her account of gastric by-
pass surgery for weight loss, Jen Larsen builds a visible spatial gap into the typography of 
her story: 
 
3 Australian Society of Anaesthetists, All About Anaesthesia: Information for Patients. web. 2016. 
http://www.allaboutanaesthesia.com.au/ 
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 “Ten,” I said. I breathed in deeply, closed my eyes. “Nine,” I said. “Eight.” 
Surgery.  
 
[A blank space to the bottom of the page; the next page begins:] 
 
When you come out of anesthesia, it feels like you’ve got your eyes closed even when they’re 
open. (112-3) 
 
The difficulties of telling about anesthetized experience are addressed by showing it in-
stead. Jamieson Dale’s account of cosmetic surgery uses a similar convention:    
 
I succumb to the drug’s effect. I’m gone.  
 
* 
 
At home after the surgery, I hesitantly peer into the mirror. (54) 
 
The asterisk serves a similar purpose in Jon Reiner’s account of abdominal surgery for 
Crohn’s disease: 
 
Lying on the operating table, … I’m comfortable…. I am adrift on a life raft, receiving the 
pleasure of peace, before losing myself to the anesthesia filtering in. 
 
* 
 
“Jon, are you awake?” J.P. has pulled open the bed curtain … (48-9) 
 
Some do try to write within that gap, and have to struggle at the limits of narratability. 
In her account of mastectomy, a far cry from Fanny Burney’s, Geralyn Lucas uses disnar-
ration (telling what did not take place, but might have) to construct a conditional presence 
that gradually inserts her narrating self into the experience.4 She begins her account in 
much the way others have: “I think I am ready…. I taste the lipstick in my mouth and it 
is mingling with the anesthesia cloud that has made me very sleepy and then—I am out” 
(54-55).  
But then she describes what she would be seeing were she conscious and connected:  “If 
I were awake I would see Dr. B slicing away the mound of flesh that was my breast and 
carefully placing it in the pathology container. If I were awake I would hear the beeping 
of my heart” (55). The verb tenses mark this not as retrospective but immediate, not “if I 
had been awake I would have…” but “If I were awake now the experience would be like 
this, but I am not, so I have to imagine this, now.” This immediacy allows her to recuperate 
both presence and, owning her decisions both to have the surgery and to wear lipstick, a 
degree of control and empowerment within the process itself: “If I were awake I would 
tell them [now, not before or after] how proud I am that I decided to cut off my breast” 
and now, no longer conditionally, she claims an immediate though presumably impossible 
emotion: “Under anesthesia, with a tube forced down my throat, I am hopeful and maybe 
even a little sexy” (55). The lipstick, signifying  her presence as a subject despite her un-
consciousness, is replicated by the effect of Lucas’s prose in writing across and through 
the temporal gap of anesthesia, claiming the experience for a reasserted self. For most, 
 
4 See Prince, 1-8. 
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though, anesthesia renders surgery a non-experience over which their only claim is that of 
the obtunded body. 
 
 
2. Trauma 
The traumatized … carry an impossible history within them, or they become 
themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess. 
Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (5) 
 
What place, then, might anaesthetized time take in the history of a patient? Is it excessive 
to imagine that place as a wound, even if the wounding event cannot be recounted? In 
their article on post-traumatic stress symptoms in patients after orthopedic surgery, Julie 
K. Cremeans-Smith and her co-authors acknowledge that an operation is “a scheduled 
trauma” (56). The physical aspects of  such a trauma are largely controllable because they 
are expected; the psychological aspects are unpredictable, for we tend to trust that anes-
thesia will prevent mental trauma. Yet resurrection after being “knocked out and brought 
back to life all fixed” can be a fairly shattering experience. Geralyn Lucas describes coming 
round as her delivery into a future dreaded from the far side of an unimagined threshold: 
“All I can see when I try to open my eyes is the white bandage where my right breast used 
to be. This is the moment I’ve been dreading: I have woken up …  and a piece of me is 
gone” (56). Like Kaysen’s concern about losing time as well as tooth, Lucas (narrating well 
after the surgery) registers that, despite her efforts to insert herself into surgery’s account-
ing, her return was marked first by loss. 
Efforts to write across the empty space in anesthesia narratives seem to resonate with 
Cathy Caruth’s account of trauma, where literary representation stands in for a repressed 
traumatic history. Caruth calls the traumatizing event an “unclaimed experience,” appre-
hended in a way that could not be integrated into coherent self-narration. She argues that 
imaginative fiction must do the work of processing trauma because non-fiction recall and 
recounting cannot: “trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an 
individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature—the way it was 
precisely not known in the first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on” (4). 
It may be that anesthesia leaves the “scheduled trauma” of surgery quite literally unas-
similated: the fact that the event has happened is made evident by the body’s wounds, but 
the lived time of it is blocked to the subject, maybe because the subject was not sentient, 
but maybe because drug-induced amnesia has set the trauma beyond assimilable recall. 
H.G. Wells’s narrator recognizes that it may be his memory of surgery rather than his 
experience of it that is anomalous:  “I wondered if everyone perceived things in this way 
under chloroform, and forgot it again when he came out of it. I would be inconvenient to 
look … and not forget” (55). Non-fiction accounts are left to disnarrate, as Lucas does, or 
simply to represent the gap itself, figuring the event of surgery, even if crucial to the au-
thor’s plot, as erasure. Yet, like Plath’s chalk marks, it will leave traces. 
Caruth’s model for trauma has been called into question—most recently by Richard 
McNally’s documenting that traumatizing events tend to produce not amnesia but its op-
posite: vivid, though possibly distorted, imprints of experience. Yet major surgery with 
general anesthesia seems, despite its beneficent intent, an exemplary case study in Caruth’s 
“unclaimed experience,” potentially leaving psychological and cognitive damage, the sub-
ject made symptom of her impossible history. Non-fiction accounts of coming round after 
surgery, like Lucas’s, record dissonance between evidence of the body’s experience and a 
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mind returning to find that things have changed. Jamieson Dale registers horror for the 
first time on seeing the effects of her cosmetic surgery: “My face. It is unrecognizable. I’m 
unrecognizable.… Something serious was done to me, to my face. Now I can’t help but 
think about the scalpel part of this. My face was cut open, and stuff was moved around and 
inserted and taken out. It’s kind of exciting but also sickening” (53-4). 
Similarly, Jen Larsen confronts “the scalpel part” but finds herself unable to imagine 
what happened: “The nurse had told me about the breathing tube, but I couldn’t imagine 
a tube threaded down through my throat. I couldn’t imagine surgery. I couldn’t imagine 
that such a huge chunk of my insides was gone” (114). She cannot narrate what she cannot 
imagine—what her mind cannot grasp—even though she was there, and it happened to 
her. In this reconstitution of self, Larsen ponders her surgery as a kind of irretrievable 
rebirth into being a different (in her case, thin) person: “I wondered how much weight I 
had lost already, how much muscle and intestine had been dragged out of my body and 
discarded” (115). She assimilates the loss, both of unwanted flesh and of violent time, as 
signs of a prehistory that anesthesia has split off from her new present. Her words, recon-
stituting the verb tenses needed for narration, show the emergence of a new history : “I 
wondered when it would start. It was about to start. It was starting. It had started” (115). 
These words mark the end of part one of her memoir. An illustration on the next two 
pages graphically disarticulates her pre- and postsurgical selves, showing a piece of paper 
with a strip ripped out of it, and the second part’s title, “the imaginary after” (116-117).  
This rupture is often seen as negligible, as Kaysen’s dentist demonstrates by refusing 
to acknowledge that her lost time means anything but pain avoided. It is coming to be 
recognized, though, that anesthesia is not as absolute an erasure as we might trust it to be. 
It is possible that the experience of being under anesthetic is unnarratable not because 
there was no experience, but only because it cannot be remembered. Anesthesia intention-
ally causes amnesia. Where for Burney surgery was agonizing to retell because it was so 
painful to recall and (almost) too horrific for a reader to receive, contemporary surgery 
may be untellable because the patient has been rendered incapable of remembering events 
that may—as Caruth posits is the case with much trauma—in fact have been experienced. 
This raises questions for medical ethics. 
 
 
3. Ethics 
[P]eople are generally aware of more things than they remember. 
Kerssens et al, Anesthesiology (570) 
 
Anesthesia is not the same as deep sleep. The drugs currently used are intended to produce 
three distinct effects: unconsciousness, paralysis, and amnesia. These three goals are not 
always equally achieved. If the first fails and the patient is conscious and aware, the second 
makes it impossible to communicate such awareness as it happens, and the third renders 
it unreportable in retrospect. The anaesthetized mind is not temporarily turned off. We 
may think of it as left trapped inside an unresponsive body it cannot protect, or as cut off, 
both from the body and from its own past and future. As Wells imagined it, the anaesthe-
tized mind may experience infinite duration between the counts of “three” and “four.” 
We—it—can’t tell. But as with all history, we know that being unable to tell that something 
happened does not mean that nothing happened, or that is had no effects. 
Incommunicable subjective experience is a problem for medical ethics. Others’ pain is 
hard enough to grasp; a sentient mind in an immobile body being dissected is the stuff of 
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nightmares. Richard Blacher begins his 1975 article on “awakening paralyzed during sur-
gery” with an epigraph from Claude Bernard, the 19th-century physiologist responsible for 
much of contemporary anesthesia design. Bernard warned that the use of curare to para-
lyze surgical patients could have serious consequences if unconsciousness did not persist: 
“In all ages poetic fictions which seek to arouse our pity have presented us with sensitive 
beings locked in immobile bodies. Our imagination cannot conceive of anything more 
unhappy.…The torture which the imaginations of the poets has invented can be found 
produced in nature by the action of the American poison [curare].”5 This unhappiness is 
inconceivable not only because of its extremity, but because it is usually unnarratable. 
Medicine is reassured by treating retrospective narratability as necessary evidence of 
experience, and of harm. Amnesia is understood, then, as making traumatization impossi-
ble. Definitions such as the following function to exclude the possibility of surgical expe-
rience that is, in Caruth’s terms, unclaimed: “Intraoperative awareness is an unwanted out-
come that consists of an explicit recall of events during a surgical procedure performed 
under general anesthesia” (Vulser et al 94). By this syntax, awareness is a post hoc outcome 
of surgery and is limited to what the patient can recall explicitly—that is, verifiably by 
others who were there and awake. Yet even by this limited definition, intraoperative aware-
ness occurs in about 1 out of 1000 surgical cases, and can have serious consequences, as 
Vulser shows: “acute and posttraumatic stress symptoms (sleep disturbances and recurrent 
nightmares, flashbacks, anxiety, fear about future anesthesia and hospital avoidance) that 
may lead to full-blown … PTSD in up to 71% of cases after IA” (94).  
The corollary of  making it hard for patients to remember surgery is that it becomes 
easier for health care providers to treat the experience of anesthetized surgery as, from the 
patient’s perspective, non-existent. Robert Sanders and his co-authors warn, though, 
against the danger of anesthetists’ trusting that the unresponsive patient—unable to com-
municate experience by wincing or withdrawing, if not by vocalizing—is necessarily un-
conscious—not experiencing. The purpose of anesthesia, they point out, is to “prevent 
the experience of surgery” altogether. Alarmingly, Sanders et al point to “a large body of 
opinion that follows a utilitarian approach, and insists that unconsciousness per se is not a 
requirement for the state of general anesthesia, but that amnesia plus immobility are the 
minimal necessary components” (947). By implication, anesthesia has been successful as 
long as the consequences of being conscious during surgery are not narratable—even if, 
for instance, the patient begins to suffer mysterious post-traumatic symptoms like night-
mares and panic attacks but can’t say why. Nonetheless, unexplained depressive disorder 
or sudden cognitive decline have been recorded in perhaps a third of patients after major 
surgery.6 
Imaginative researchers have developed a way to establish sentience during anesthesia 
independent of recall, simply by isolating patients’ forearms from paralysis and asking 
them to respond with hand squeezes to questions asked during the operation. Chantal 
Kerssens and her co-authors frame this study with a careful (re)definition: “we distinguish 
the literal meaning of awareness, referring to conscious subjective experiences, from the 
common definition used by anesthesia staff, referring to postoperative remembering what 
happened during surgery” (570). Only a quarter of the patients who responded unequivo-
cally to commands given while they were anaesthetized were able to recall the surgery 
afterwards. 
 
5 Barnard, “La curare,” 1878, qtd in Blacher, 67. 
6 See for example Ghoneim and O’Hara, who report a 30-40% rate of depression and other psycholog-
ical impairments following coronary bypass surgery. 
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A different study found that seven out of thirty patients developed severe anxiety after 
cardiopulmonary bypass surgery. Two of them had what the author calls “narrative 
memory” of being alert during the surgery, but another five were able “to tell a story of 
what happened” under hypnosis (Osterman 274). The amnesia was, it seems, a relatively 
shallow patch over vivid experience: one man “described his leg being cut, hearing voices, 
and feeling as if he ‘wasn’t going to pull through it’”; he then “became flushed and un-
comfortable and spontaneously terminated hypnosis.”7 The amnesia was restored. Setting 
aside the ethics of subjecting a patient through hypnosis to what turned out to be (re)trau-
matizing, the diagnostic value of the experiment is significant—postsurgical psychopathol-
ogy may well be caused by the unclaimed experience of intraoperative awareness. 
Anesthesia, then, in separating awareness from memory, generates a narrative rupture 
or gap for the patient that, while it registers as a lacuna like that blank space on the page 
of a memoir, may be populated with horrors. (Or, in some cases it may even be filled with 
the wonders H. G. Wells imagined—the point is we can’t tell.) The gap demarcated by 
anesthesia may also correspond to an unnarrated gap in medical knowledge, an aporia in 
medicine’s attention to persons: what if the subject’s self is present in places where medi-
cine really hopes it is not? It is a basic ethical presumption that sentient beings have greater 
moral claims than non-sentient beings. Inducing amnesia thus risks diminishing the moral 
status of anesthetized patients regarding events that clinicians trust will be erased afterward 
by amnestic drugs. For example: surgeons have to been known to say things during surgery 
that they would not dream of saying if they imagined the patient could hear them, and 
medical students have been expected to practice unindicated procedures on anesthetized 
patients (see Wall and Brown). If the patient wasn’t mentally present when it happened 
and remembers nothing, goes the implicit rationalization, then it didn’t happen to her. 
There is an imperative here, then, for clinicians to assume uncertainty. The patient’s 
surgical experience, at whatever level of intraoperative awareness, must not meet with 
medicine’s rejection of the possibility that sentience exists where, biologically, it is not 
supposed to. Even if we could be certain that ablation of experience was complete, the 
clinician—like Kaysen’s dentist—is accountable for the patient’s lost time and should be 
responsible for helping to restore it.  
There is evidence that co-construction of a narrative that bridges the surgical gap is 
effective. In 1975 Richard Blacher described a “syndrome of traumatic neurosis” in pa-
tients who “awakened from light anesthesia while still unable to move” (67). They devel-
oped “symptoms of anxiety and irritability, preoccupation with death, and repetitive night-
mares.” Blacher urged physicians to suspect intraoperative awareness in such patients, 
even though, he says, the patient might be reluctant to talk about it. Blacher attributes 
patients’ unwillingness to tell what happened to their fear that the experience was a delu-
sion or that others will dismiss it as just a dream. He reports finding that a “direct expla-
nation of the situation often serves as a dramatic cure” of the psychiatric symptoms (67). 
Blacher’s article was published long ago, yet I suspect fear of admitting failure, and fear 
of liability, still makes admitting the probability of intraoperative awareness unlikely. In 
fact, medicine may be quite invested in sustaining the illusion that awareness and experi-
ence can be limited to what can be remembered and narrated. The things medicine has 
difficulty narrating are often things turned away from because they are too horrific to con-
template. 
 
7 Janet E. Osterman, Bessel A. van der Kolk. “Awareness during anesthesia and posttraumatic stress 
disorder” General Hospital Psychiatry 20 (1998) 274–281. 
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Nonetheless, the possibility is acknowledged in some contexts. That Australian Society 
of Anaesthetists’ web site, as well as reassuring patients that their first words after surgery 
may be “when will you start?” also attends to the greatest fear of many:  
 
It is extremely unlikely that you will be awake during a general anesthetic, but it is possible. 
There have been descriptions of patients who can recall events that occurred during the 
operation when they were apparently anaesthetized. This recollection is called awareness. 
 
Although awareness is again limited to what can be explicitly recalled, the clinician’s 
role in helping claim the experience is emphasized: “Explaining what probably occurred is 
the first step in helping these patients to overcome the severe psychological distress and 
trauma that some have suffered from no one believing that they were awake during the proce-
dure.”8 The trauma is not attributed to the awareness at all, but to invalidation of the 
patient’s account of the experience. Such invalidation follows from medicine’s fearful in-
ability—or refusal—to engage patients after the operation—and maybe even before it—
in exploring the effects and limitations of general anesthesia, and in participating in what 
Fanny Burney called the tying up, afterwards, of that second surgical wound, the trauma-
tized narrative. 
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